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The plaintiff and appellant, Oquirrh Associates, submits
this reply to the Brief of Appellee Frank Bernard and the Brief of
Appellees Forthcoming Investments, Annette P. Cumming, Ian M.
Cumming and Stephen D. Swindle (the "Forthcoming defendants").1

REPLY TO STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The defendants and appellees claim that Oquirrh did not
raise issue 5 below.

They also argue that Oquirrh did not raise

issue 3 below with respect to Forthcoming and, with respect to
issue 6, never asserted that the covenant against waste ran with
the land.

Therefore, they argue, this court should not consider

those issues.
Issue 5 was whether Forthcoming became bound by the
Oquirrh-Loiselle contract when it accepted a quitclaim deed from
the Loiselles.

Oquirrh's complaint alleged that the defendants

were in default under the Oquirrh-Loiselle contract.

1

R. 4-5.

The Forthcoming defendants argue that the trial court
correctly granted summary judgment to defendants Annette P.
Cumming, Ian M. Cumming and Stephen D. Swindle. Oquirrh agrees
that its only claim against Mr. Swindle was to clear title to the
property and that it seeks no affirmative relief from him. See
Record (MR.M) 669 & 800. Oquirrh also agrees that the Cummings'
liability is based on their position as general partners of
Forthcoming and therefore stands or falls with Forthcoming's
liability. The Forthcoming defendants claim that Mr. Cumming has
never been a general partner of Forthcoming. However, Mr. Cumming
signed a notarized document in which he stated that he was a
general partner of Forthcoming. R. 181-84. That was sufficient to
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not Mr.
Cumming was a general partner of Forthcoming. See Arnica Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
- 1 -

Early in the case, the Forthcoming defendants moved for partial
summary judgment on the grounds that the relevant documents showed
they did not assume any liability to Oquirrh.

See R. 308-09, 316.

In response to that motion, Oquirrh argued that the quitclaim deed
to Forthcoming from the Loiselles, who were in direct privity with
Oquirrh, created a fact question as to whether Forthcoming had
assumed any liability to Oquirrh.

R. 298-99.2

Later, Oquirrh

raised the issue again, in its motion to set aside the partial
summary judgments entered in favor of the defendants. It expressly
argued that Forthcoming was liable to Oquirrh under the OquirrhLoiselle contract as the Loiselles' direct successor by reason of
the Loiselle-Forthcoming quitclaim deed.

R. 791-94.

Issue 3 was whether Oquirrh acquired privity of contract
with the defendants when it had writs of garnishment issued against
them. Forthcoming responded to the writ of garnishment by claiming
it owed Chad and the Loiselles nothing.

R. 379-80.

Oquirrh

replied that Forthcoming was liable to Chad for breach of its
covenants

to

Chad,

including

its

covenant

to

perform

the

obligations Chad assumed under the Bernard-Brady contract. R. 45253.

2

Oquirrh withdrew its own motion for partial summary
judgment on the grounds that the deed from the Loiselles to
Forthcoming created factual disputes as to whether Forthcoming
assumed any obligation under the Oquirrh-Loiselle contract. R.
456.
- 2 -

The defendants do not dispute that Oquirrh raised issue
6 below, namely, whether subsequent purchasers of the property
could be liable for waste.

They claim that Oquirrh never argued

below that subsequent purchasers could be liable for waste because
the covenant against waste ran with the land.
No record was made of the hearing on the parties' crossmotions for summary judgment, so there is no record of the issues
raised at the hearing. Nevertheless, Oquirrh did allege below that
subsequent purchasers could be liable for waste regardless of
whether they had possession at the time of the waste.

R. 658-59.

It also alleged that the defendants could be liable to Oquirrh for
their breach of the contractual covenants not to commit waste or
allow waste to be committed on the property. See, e.g. , R. 655-62,
719-25, 889.
Oquirrh further alleged that Forthcoming could be liable
to the Loiselles under the quitclaim deed from the Loiselles since
the transaction touched and concerned the property and there was
direct privity between Forthcoming and the Loiselles. R. 453. The
privity between Forthcoming and the Loiselles was privity of
estate, and the touch and concern requirement is a requirement for
a covenant to run with the land.
Oquirrh also argued below that this case was factually
similar to Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).

See R. 796-98.

The court in Heiner held that the

contract at issue there was an assignment rather than a sublease or
- 3 -

subpurchase and that privity of estate existed between the parties,
"thereby making the benefits and burdens of those covenants which
run with the land enforceable directly by the . . . assignee
against the other party."

See 790 P.2d at 111-12 n.3.

REPLY TO STANDARD OF REVIEW
The

Forthcoming

defendants

claim

mischaracterized the standard of review.

that

Oquirrh

has

They claim that, on an

appeal from a grant of a motion for summary judgment, the appellate
court will consider the facts in the light most favorable to the
losing party only when the appellate court determines there is a
genuine issue of material fact; otherwise, the grant of a summary
judgment is reviewed for correctness.
To prevail on summary judgment, the moving party must
show that (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact and (2)
the undisputed material facts entitle it to a judgment as a matter
of law.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The trial court's conclusions on

both of these issues present questions of law that are reviewed for
correctness.

See Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989).

However, because summary judgment denies a party the opportunity to
present its case on the merits, in deciding whether the trial court
correctly found that there were no genuine issues of material fact
and that the movant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, an
appellate court must review the facts and inferences to be drawn
from them in the light most favorable to the appellant and construe
any doubts or uncertainties in favor of the appellant. Atlas Corp.
- 4 -

v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); Robinson v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. 740 P.2d 262, 263 (Utah Ct. App.
1987)•

In other words, it must "view the facts in the light most

likely to create factual questions" and construe them "against the
party who bears the burden of proving that summary judgment was
appropriate." Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v.
Mountain States Tel, & Tel, Co,. 844 P.2d 322, 324 n.l (Utah 1992),
ARGUMENT
I.
WHETHER BERNARD ASSUMED THE LOISELLES' OBLIGATIONS
TO OQUIRRH IS A DISPUTED QUESTION OF FACT.
Oquirrh argued in its principal brief that defendant
Frank P. Bernard's payments on the Loiselles' obligations under the
Oquirrh-Loiselle contract raised a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether Bernard had assumed the Loiselles' obligations to
Oquirrh, despite the language in the Loiselle-Bernard contract that
Bernard accepted only the obligations imposed by that agreement.3
In response, Bernard argues that, in addition to the contract
language, the fact that the Oquirrh-Loiselle and Loiselle-Bernard
contracts contained different terms and that the Loiselles sold
their beneficial interest in the Loiselle-Bernard contract without
Bernard's knowledge or consent show that Bernard did not assume the

3

The fact that
necessarily mean that
obligations to Oquirrh.
107, 115 n.12 (Utah Ct.

separate contracts were involved does not
Bernard did not assume the Loiselles'
Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co. , 790 P. 2d
App. 1990).
- 5 -

Loiselles' obligations to Oquirrh.

Bernard relied on some of the

same evidence in opposing Oquirrh's first motion for partial
summary judgment.

At that time, however, Bernard conceded that

there was f,a substantial fact question as to whether there is an
implied

assumption

on

the

part

of

Bernard

to

perform

the

obligations of Loiselle under their contract with [Oquirrh]."
221.

R.

Nothing has changed to alter that conclusion.
In determining whether there is a genuine issue of

material fact, the appellate court considers only those facts
properly cited to and supported by the record. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

It takes

only one sworn statement to create a genuine issue of fact,
precluding summary judgment.

£d. (citing Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp.

v. Clark. 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)).

It does not

matter that the evidence on one side may appear stronger than the
evidence on the other side or may even be "compelling."
Prudential

Ins. Co. of Am.,

(citations omitted).

763

P.2d

761, 765

Hardy v.

(Utah

1988)

There was evidence that Bernard made the

Loiselles' payments to Oquirrh for over nine years.

See R. 655.

This evidence raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Bernard assumed the Loiselles' obligations to Oquirrh and thus
4

Bernard also argues that he did not make payments to
Oquirrh over the life of the Oquirrh-Loiselle contract. However,
he cites no evidence in the record to support this assertion. The
only evidence in the record that Oquirrh has found is that Bernard
paid Oquirrh monthly until September 1988, when the payments to
Oquirrh stopped. R. 655.
- 6 -

could be liable under the Oquirrh-Loiselle contract.

Cf. Kunzman

v. Thorsen, 740 P.2d 754, 759-60 (Or. 1987) (actions of buyers'
assignees in taking possession and making payments directly to the
seller showed their intention to assume the buyers' obligations to
the seller); Radlev v. Smith. 6 Utah 2d 314, 313 P.2d 465, 466-67
(1957) (where the assignee of the seller's interest in real estate
contracts knew of the services required of the seller and initially
accepted and performed those responsibilities, there was sufficient
evidence to support the trial court's finding that she had assumed
the seller's duties under the contracts).

Bernard's arguments to

the contrary are properly addressed to the finder of fact and do
not justify summary judgment in his favor.
II.
THE WRITS OF GARNISHMENT GAVE OQUIRRH THE RIGHT
TO ENFORCE THE DEFENDANTS' CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS.
Oquirrh had writs of garnishment issued against Bernard
and Forthcoming. As Forthcoming recognizes, the writs gave Oquirrh
the right

to recover whatever debts the garnishees

Oquirrh's

judgment

debtors

(the

Loiselles

and

owed to

Chad).

The

defendants claim, however, that they owed no debts to their
sellers.
Bernard argues that he owed no debt to the Loiselles
under the Loiselle-Bernard

contract because the Loiselles had

assigned their right to receive payments under the Loiselle-Bernard
contract to Forthcoming by a quitclaim deed dated December 2, 1983.
- 7 -

However, the assignment merely conveyed the Loiselles' right to
collect monies due under the Loiselle-Bernard contract.

R. 427.

The payment obligation was just one of the obligations Bernard, as
buyer, owed the Loiselles under that contract.

He also owed them

duties to pay property taxes and other assessments on the property,
not to commit or suffer to be committed any waste on the property
and to maintain the property in good condition. These obligations
were not assigned to Forthcoming.

Oquirrh could therefore attach

by writ of garnishment Bernard's liability to the Loiselles for
breach of these obligations.
Moreover, there is at least a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether Forthcoming waived its right to receive payments
under the Loiselle-Bernard contract, since Bernard continued to
make payments directly to Oquirrh even after the assignment.

See

R. 655. The assignment from the Loiselles to Forthcoming therefore
did not preclude Oquirrh from enforcing the Loiselles' contract
claims against Bernard.
Similarly, Forthcoming's alleged satisfaction of its
financial

obligations to Chad did not preclude

Oquirrh from

enforcing Chad's contractual claims against Forthcoming. The only
obligation to Chad that Forthcoming satisfied was its obligation to
pay Chad $52,817.63 for the assignment of Chad's interest under the
Bernard-Brady contract.

See R. 599.

By paying Chad for the

assignment, Forthcoming satisfied only one of its obligations to
Chad.
- 8 -

The assignment from Chad to Forthcoming also required
Forthcoming to "keep, observe and perform all of the terms,
conditions and provisions of the [Bernard-Brady] Contract that are
to be kept, observed and performed by [Chad]." R. 398 5 2.6. Chad
was obligated to make the payments required by the Bernard-Brady
contract.

Forthcoming assumed that obligation.

See R. 321, 430.

Forthcoming's payment to Chad did not satisfy Chad's obligation to
pay the purchase price under the Bernard-Brady contract.

In fact,

Forthcoming continued to make the payments Chad had assumed under
the Bernard-Brady

contract

after

it supposedly

satisfied

its

obligations to Chad. In other words, Forthcoming's payment to Chad
merely compensated Chad for its equity in the property. It did not
satisfy any of Chad's obligations as buyer under the Bernard-Brady
contract, including the obligation to make the monthly contract
payments, to pay taxes and to maintain the property

in good

condition and not allow waste to be committed on the property. By
defaulting on the buyers' obligations under the Bernard-Brady
contract, Forthcoming incurred liability to Chad, which Oquirrh
could garnish.
The cases Forthcoming relies on are distinguishable.
Those cases merely held that an unliquidated tort claim could not
be litigated in a garnishment proceeding.

See Auerbach Company v.

Key Security Police, Inc., 680 P.2d 740, 742-43 (Utah 1984); Paul
v. Kirkendall, 6 Utah 2d 256, 311 P.2d 376, 379 (1957).
Oquirrh's derivative rights are contractual in nature.
- 9 -

Here,
Oquirrh

stands in the shoes of the Loiselles and Chad, who had privity of
contract with Bernard and Forthcoming, respectively.

Oquirrh was

therefore entitled to recover whatever amounts the Loiselles and
Chad

could

Forthcoming.

recover

under

their

contracts

with

Bernard

and

Cf. Weir v. Galbraith. 376 P.2d 396, 401-02 (Ariz.

1962) (garnishment was effective with respect to installments of a
sales contract that were not yet due when the writ was served).
III.
THE ASSIGNMENT FROM CHAD TO OQUIRRH GAVE
OQUIRRH RIGHTS AGAINST FORTHCOMING.
Forthcoming claims that the assignment from Chad to
Oquirrh did not give Oquirrh any claim against Forthcoming because
Chad had no claim against Forthcoming at the time of the assignment
since Forthcoming had discharged all its financial obligations to
Chad.

The only obligation Forthcoming had discharged was its

obligation to pay Chad $52,817.63 to buy Chad's interest in the
Bernard-Brady contract.

Forthcoming also owed Chad a duty to

perform the buyers' obligations under that contract. See supra pt.
II.

There was evidence that Forthcoming did not perform the

buyers' obligation to make the monthly payments required under the
Bernard-Brady contract.

R. 655 |5 3-5, 806-07.

There was also

evidence that taxes had not been paid on the property, that the
property had not been properly insured, see R. 104-06, and that the
property had not been maintained, R. 655-56 ff 6-7, all as required
by the contracts.

In fact, Forthcoming had alleged as much in its
10 -

cross-claim against its assignee, First National Leasing.
53-55.

Oguirrh,

as the

assignee

of

Chad's

claims

See R.
against

Forthcoming, therefore had a claim against Forthcoming for its
breach of the buyers' obligations under the Bernard-Brady contract.
Chad did not have to wait for Bernard to assert a claim
against Chad before Chad could assert a claim against Forthcoming.
Chad, as Forthcoming's assignor, remained secondarily liable to
perform the buyer's obligations under the Bernard-Brady contract.
See, e.g., Kintner v. Harr, 408 P.2d 487, 497 (Mont. 1965).

The

relationship between Forthcoming and Chad was that of principal
obligor and surety, 77 Am. Jur. 2d Vendor and Purchaser § 397
(1975) , and a surety does not have to wait until the creditor sues
him before he can maintain an action against the principal debtor
to compel the principal to pay the debt, 74 Am. Jur. 2d Suretyship
§ 174 (1974) .
Moreover, Bernard in fact asserted a claim against Chad
(and the other successors to the buyers' interest under the
Bernard-Brady contract).

See R. 134-37.

Forthcoming claims that Oquirrh's foreclosure of the
Oguirrh-Loiselle contract made it impossible for Bernard to convey
title to the property and that Forthcoming was therefore discharged
by Bernard's anticipatory breach of the contract.5
5

The reason

At the same time, Forthcoming also argues that a default
under one contract does not excuse the buyer's obligation to make
payments under another contract. See Brief of Appellees at 17-18.
By Forthcoming's own reasoning, the Loiselles' default under their
- 11 -

Oquirrh foreclosed on the property was because the Loiselles had
defaulted on their payments under the Oquirrh-Loiselle contract.
The evidence showed that those payments were being made by Bernard
and that Bernard stopped making the payments because he was not
being

paid

under

the

Bernard-Brady

contract.

See R.

655.

Forthcoming had agreed to make the payments under the Bernard-Brady
contract.

See R. 398.

Forthcoming's breach of its obligation

caused Bernard to lose the ability to convey title to the property.
Forthcoming cannot rely on its seller's alleged anticipatory breach
to

excuse

its

contractual

responsible for the breach.

obligations

when

it

itself

was

Windward Partners v. Lopes, 640 P.2d

872, 874 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982); Montana Bank of Circle, N.A. v.
Ralph Meyers & Son, Inc., 769 P.2d 1208, 1214 (Mont. 1989); Alk v.
Lanini, 656 P.2d 367, 369 (Or. Ct. App. 1982), review denied, 661
P.2d 549 (Or. 1983).
Forthcoming

argues

that

it

could

not

have

caused

Oquirrh's foreclosure because Oquirrh's only contract was with the
Loiselles.

The Loiselles were required to pay Oquirrh regardless

of what happened under the other contracts. Therefore, Forthcoming
argues, only the Loiselles' breach of contract was relevant. That
is like arguing that one who rear-ends another car, starting a
series of collisions, is not responsible for any injury to the
driver of the last car. Forthcoming cites no law in support of its
contract with Oquirrh, which caused Oquirrh's foreclosure, did not
excuse Forthcoming's breach of the Bernard-Brady contract.
- 12 -

argument,

Cf. Sortland v. Sandwick, 386 P.2d 130, 131-32 (Wash.

1963) (driver who starts a chain reaction can be liable to other
drivers in the chain).

The evidence shows that Bernard lost his

ability to convey title because he stopped making the monthly
payments under the Oquirrh-Loiselle contract, that he stopped
making the payments because he himself was not being paid under the
Bernard-Brady

contract

and

that

Forthcoming

had

assumed

the

obligation to make the payments under the Bernard-Brady contract.
Forthcoming was therefore responsible (with others in its chain of
title) for Bernard's inability to convey clear title and therefore
cannot use that inability to excuse its own nonperformance.

Even

if Oquirrh would not have a claim directly against Forthcoming for
its default under the Bernard-Brady contract, Chad would, and
Oguirrh succeeded to Chad's claims against Forthcoming when it took
an assignment of those claims.

Oquirrh therefore had a claim

against Forthcoming for breach of the buyers' obligations under the
Bernard-Brady contract.
If Forthcoming thought there had been an anticipatory
breach of the Bernard-Brady contract, it should have said something
about it at the time. Hurwitz v. David K. Richards & Co., 2 0 Utah
2d 232, 436 P.2d 794, 795 (1968). Forthcoming has not cited to any
evidence that it declared an anticipatory breach of contract, sued
for damages or tried to rescind the contract because of Bernard's
alleged inability to convey good title. Forthcoming therefore lost
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any claim it may have had of anticipatory breach. 436 P.2d at 79596.
In any event, even if Bernard lost the ability to convey
title when Oquirrh foreclosed on the property, the foreclosure did
not

make

his

performance

absolutely

impossible,

just

more

difficult. See Petersen v. Intermountain Capital Corp.. 29 Utah 2d
271, 508 P.2d 536, 538 (1973). Bernard was only required to convey
title after all the payments under the Bernard-Brady contract had
been made.

Neves v. Wright. 638 P.2d 1195, 1197 (Utah 1981).

Bernard could still acquire title to the property and thus perform
his part of the bargain.
not excused.

Forthcoming's performance was therefore

See Campbell v. Kerr. 618 P.2d 1237, 1242-43 (N.M.

1980).
IV.
FORTHCOMING SUCCEEDED TO THE LOISELLES' INTEREST UNDER THE
OQUIRRH-LOISELLE CONTRACT AND THUS BECAME BOUND BY THAT CONTRACT.
The Oquirrh-Loiselle contract states that it is binding
on "the heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns of
the respective parties." R. 16. Forthcoming took a quitclaim deed
from the Loiselles, giving Forthcoming all the Loiselles' "right,
title and interest" in the property. R. 426-27.

Forthcoming thus

became a successor to the Loiselles and was bound by the OquirrhLoiselle contract. Forthcoming argues that the quitclaim deed did
not assign to Forthcoming the Loiselles' obligations to Oquirrh but
only assigned the Loiselles' right to receive payments under the
- 14 -

Loiselle-Bernard

contract.

The

quitclaim

deed

only

limited

Forthcoming's liability under the Loiselle-Bernard contract.

It

did not expressly limit Forthcoming's liability under the OquirrhLoiselle contract.
contract

binding

The Oquirrh-Loiselle
on

the

Loiselles'

contract makes that
"heirs,

executors,

administrators, successors and assigns," and Forthcoming succeeded
to the Loiselles' interest in the property when it took a quitclaim
deed from the Loiselles.

It was therefore bound by the Oquirrh-

Loiselle contract.
V.
A PARTY NOT IN POSSESSION CAN STILL
BE LIABLE FOR WASTE COMMITTED ON THE PROPERTY.
The defendants argue that they cannot be liable for any
waste committed on the property because waste requires (1) some act
constituting waste, (2) done by one legally in possession, and (3)
to the prejudice of the estate or interest of another, see Hansen
v. Green River Group. 748 P.2d 1102, 1106 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ,6
and the defendants were not legally in possession of the property
when any waste was committed.
Oquirrh concedes that there is no evidence that either
Bernard or Forthcoming personally committed

any waste on the

property or that any waste was committed between March 1, 1919, and
November 15, 1979, while Bernard had actual possession of the
6

For its definition of waste, Hansen relied on Jowdy v.
Guerin, 457 P.2d 745, 748 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969), discussed infra.
See 748 P.2d at 1106.
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property, or between December 22, 1983, and March 30, 1988, while
Forthcoming had actual possession of the property.

That does not

necessarily mean, however, that Bernard and Forthcoming cannot be
liable for waste committed on the property.
The contractual covenant against waste was broader than
a mere covenant not to commit waste. The buyers agreed neither to
commit nor "suffer to be committed any waste" on the property and
to "maintain said premises in good condition."

R. 483 f 15; 708 f

15;

to

715

J

15.

By

allowing

the property

be wasted

by

subpurchasers, the defendants breached those covenants.
Although an action for waste is generally an action by an
out-of-possession owner against an offending party in possession,
a common

law waste action may be maintained

possessory defendant.

against

a non-

Smith v. Cap Concrete, 184 Cal. Rptr. 308,

311 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
In Wilson v. Kruse, 258 P.2d 112 (Or. 1953), for example,
a lessor brought an action for waste against its tenant.

The

tenant had sublet the entire premises to a third party, "which
alone occupied the premises during the entire term of the lease"
and had committed whatever waste was committed on the property.
The court upheld a judgment for waste against the tenant, even
though it was not in possession when the waste was committed.7

7

The court modified the award to eliminate treble damages
against the tenant.
- 16 -

This case is similar to two cases arising in Arizona—
Jowdy v. Guerinr 457 P.2d 745 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969) , cited with
approval in Hansen v. Green River Group. 748 P.2d 1102, 1106 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988), and Micuda v. McDonald fin re Evergreen Ventures).
147 Bankr. 751 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992).
In Jowdy. a small home was sold on contract. The Jowdys
took an assignment of the buyer's interest in the contract but did
not live in the home.
trashed it.

They left the property empty, and someone

Mrs. Guerin, the assignee of the original seller,

brought an action against the Jowdys for waste.
recognized

that

an

action

for

waste

The court first

requires

(1)

"an

act

constituting waste," (2) "done by one legally in possession" of the
property,

(3) "to the prejudice of the estate or interest" of

another in the property.

457 P.2d at 748.

The court found that

the first two elements were easily met:
The facts are undisputed that the defendants completely
divorced themselves from any concern over the property
and did not make any plans for its protection.
We
believe this act clearly amounts to evidence upon which
the trier of fact can find negligence required to
constitute permissive waste since during the time of the
waste defendants had the possessory rights to the
property.
Id.

The fact that the defendants never took actual possession of

the property was not dispositive:
Although the evidence does not show the actual cause of
the deterioration of the house, it does reflect that the
defendants did not provide for its protection in any
manner whatever while in constructive possession and that
they have failed to show that the deterioration was
caused by anything other than their negligence.
- 17 -

Id.

The court held that the assignees of a vendee could be

responsible for waste "at least in a case such as this where at all
times the defendants were

in constructive possession

of the

property and the successor of the vendor's interest did not have
notice that the property was being abandoned and neglected.11

Id.

at 749.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Arizona recently followed Jowdy in a case even more on point,
Micuda v. McDonald

fin re Evergreen Ventures), 147 Bankr. 751

(Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992).

The debtor in that case was Evergreen

Ventures, a limited partnership whose general partner was John
Micuda.

Evergreen bought an apartment complex on contract.

sellers had taken good care of the property.

The

Evergreen owned the

property for about six years, during which time it allowed the
property to deteriorate markedly. In June 1989, Evergreen sold the
property to a third party, a Mr. Krishnan, who allowed further
deterioration of the property.
from Krishnan
November 1989.

in September

Evergreen recovered the property

1989 and filed

for bankruptcy in

The original sellers obtained relief from the

automatic stay, held a foreclosure sale and regained possession of
the property.
property.

They then spent substantial sums to restore the

An action was brought

in the bankruptcy

case to

determine Micuda's liability to the original sellers.
The court held Micuda

liable for the full cost of

restoring the property, despite the fact that some of the waste
- 18 -

occurred while Krishnan, Evergreen's successor, owned the property.
The court noted that the first two elements of a cause of action
for waste were easily established:
constituting permissive waste:

First, "[t]here was an act

Evergreen

failed

to exercise

ordinary care in the preservation of the complex," and, second,
"[t]hese

omissions

occurred

while

Evergreen

was

legally

in

possession of the premises," despite the fact that some of the
omissions occurred while Krishnan, Evergreen's buyer, owned the
property.

147 Bankr. at 756.
This case is indistinguishable from Micuda. Oquirrh sold

the property in 1977. In late March 1988 Forthcoming assigned its
interest in the property to First National Leasing.

By July 1988

First National had neglected the property and stopped making
payments on it.

R. 104 J 4.

By January, Oquirrh had to bring an

action to foreclose on the property and have a receiver appointed.
R. 2-8. Oquirrh "sold a . . . project that was well managed and in
good condition.

[It] received a set of run-down units in very poor

condition following [Bernard's and Forthcoming's] ownership of the
premises." See Micuda, 147 Bankr. at 756. Bernard and Forthcoming
are therefore liable for the waste committed on the property.

A

party ought not to be able to escape its duty not to commit or
allow waste on the property simply by giving possession of the
property to an irresponsible third party that will waste the
property.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in the brief of appellant and in
this reply, the district court's rulings should be reversed to the
extent

they barred

Oguirrh

from pursuing

its claims against

subsequent purchasers of the property for allowing waste to be
committed on the property and from pursuing contract claims against
Bernard and Forthcoming based on the writs of garnishment and
assignment of Chad's claims,
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